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Abstract: A negative interest rate policy is often accompanied by tiered remuneration, which allows 
for exemption from negative rates. This study proposes a basic model of interest rates formed in the 
interbank market with a tiering system. The results predicted by the model largely mirror actual 
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National Bank modified, the tiering system. 
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1. Introduction 
Central banks that have imposed negative interest rates have recently either introduced a tiering 
system or modified the existing one, such that it exempts the burden of negative interest rate up to a 
predefined limit. Danmarks Nationalbank, the central bank of Denmark, has been using negative 
interest rates with a tiering system for more than five years and reduced the policy rate by 10 bps to 
−0.75% in September 2019. The European Central Bank (ECB) introduced a two-tier system from 
October 2019, following a 10-bps rate cut to −0.50% a month before. In November 2019, the Swiss 
National Bank modified its tiering system by increasing the exemption threshold for banks. 
This tiering system may introduce a few knock-on effects in the market. First, the system mitigates 
the cost burden of a negative interest rate for financial institutions. Second, it helps increase the 
interbank market trading activity, which is a result of the arbitrage opportunities arising from the 
differences in remuneration rates. For example, Bank A, which has exceeded the allocated exemption 
amount, may want to lend cash in the market if the market rate is higher than the negative rates 
charged by the central bank; at the same time, bank B, which has not reached the upper limit of the 
exemption amount will borrow cash from the market provided that the market rate is below the zero 
rate. This arbitrage activity may, however, lead to a negative effect by raising the market rate to a 
level higher than in a market without a tiering system. In other words, the tiering system weakens the 
transmission of the negative remuneration rate to the interbank market. 
     This study formulates a basic model of an interbank market with tiering remuneration and aims to 
describe these three effects, that is, burden mitigation, trading volume, and rate formation. The 
simplicity of the model allows it to be tested with actual market data, but this simplicity also means 
that the model assumes high liquidity across all banks and negligible payment shocks. If the model 
were to include shocks, such as central bank lending mentioned in Poole’s (1968) framework, the 
market rate would become the risk-weighted average of the central bank’s lending and deposit facility 
rate (Bindseil, 2004). The market rate in the model discussed in this paper will, however, be linked to 
the exemption size. 
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Other authors have also conducted research on this subject in recent years. Boutros and Witmer 
(2017) introduced a theoretical model with a tiering remuneration system but without testing actual 
market data. A year later, Afonso et al. (2018) successfully tested a model using market data, 
comparing their model of the United States Federal Funds market with individual bank-level data. 
 
 
2. Model and Equilibrium 
Setup in the morning  
Bank 𝑖 has a profile of excess liquidity 𝑥𝑖 and cost regarding trade transactions (except for the 
trading rate) 𝑐𝑖%. We assume uniform and mutually independent distributions of 𝑥𝑖~(0,1) and 
𝑐𝑖~(0,1), for simplicity. 
Tiering remuneration in the afternoon 
Bank 𝑖 follows the following remuneration schedule: 0% is applied to the reserve position in the 
afternoon 𝑥a𝑖 up to the individual limit of exemption 𝑢𝑖 and −1% is applied to the exceeding amount. 
We assume 𝑢𝑖 is the same for all institutions, i.e. 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢.  
The share of the aggregated amount of the upper limit of exemption relative to the aggregated excess 
liquidity, Exemption Share (E), is calculated as: 
 
𝐸 = ∫ 𝑢𝑖
𝑖
d𝑖 ∫ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖
d𝑖⁄ = 2𝑢 (1) 
 
Trading decision during the day  
Bank 𝑖 decides to either lend 𝑙𝑖, borrow 𝑏𝑖, or do nothing. The decision is made by comparing the 
market rate −𝑟%, associated cost 𝑐𝑖%, remuneration rate 0% for the exemption amount, and −1% for 
the exceeding amount. 
 𝑥a𝑖 = {
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑙𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑢𝑖 and − 𝑟 − 𝑐𝑖 − (−1) > 0 
𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖, 𝑢𝑖 > 𝑥𝑖 and 0 − (−𝑟) − 𝑐𝑖 > 0
𝑥𝑖, otherwise
 (2) 
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The concept modeled in (2) is that bank 𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 > 𝑢𝑖) will lend money if the income from lending −𝑟 
minus cost 𝑐𝑖 minus the opportunity cost to receive remuneration −1 is positive. Similarly, bank 𝑖 
(𝑢𝑖 > 𝑥𝑖) will borrow money if the income from borrowing 𝑟 minus cost 𝑐𝑖 is positive. 
 
Equilibrium market rate  
Market rate −𝑟∗ should be decided such that it balances the aggregated lending and borrowing 
needs. This amount is known as the trading volume 𝑉.  
  
𝑉 = ∫ 𝑙𝑖
𝑖
d𝑖 = ∫ 𝑏𝑖
𝑖
d𝑖 (3) 
  
𝑉 = ∫ max(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖, 0) ∙ 𝟏{−r∗−ci+1>0}
i
di = ∫ max(𝑢𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖, 0) ∙ 𝟏{r∗−ci>0}
i
di (4) 
  
𝑉 =
1
2
(1 − 𝑢)2(1 − 𝑟∗) =
1
2
𝑢2𝑟∗ (5) 
Using equation (5), we have 
 −𝑟∗ =
−(1 − 𝑢)2
𝑢2 + (1 − 𝑢)2
 (6) 
  
𝑉 =
1
2
𝑢2(1 − 𝑢)2
𝑢2 + (1 − 𝑢)2
 (7) 
Further, there are some banks that have reserves exceeding 𝑢𝑖 but avoid lending because of associated 
costs. Then the share of the aggregated amounts to which the negative rate is to be applied, relative to 
the aggregated excess liquidity, Negative Remuneration Share (𝑁) is calculated as:  
 
𝑁 = ∫ max(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑢, 0) ∙ 𝟏{−𝑟∗−𝑐𝑖+1≤0}
𝑖
d𝑖 ∫ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖
d𝑖⁄ =
(1 − 𝑢)4
𝑢2 + (1 − 𝑢)2
 (8) 
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3. Testing with actual data 
Figure 1 shows a plot of the average data for the 3rd and 4th quarters of 2019 of 𝐸 plotted against 
the observed market rate for four currencies with tiering systems. The observed rate is the overnight 
or next day rate standardized by dividing it by the degree of negative remuneration. The bold line 
shows the theoretical −𝑟∗ using (6). Key changes in the negative interest rate policy and tiering, as 
mentioned in Section 1, were made between the 3rd and 4th quarters of 2019. Consequently, the 
relative position of the two points for each currency represent the impact of the changes in the market 
rate. The effect is pronounced for the Euro (EUR) and Swiss franc (CHF), as we exclude the term 
before these changes in the calculation of the average for the 4th quarter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: NASDAQ, Six Swiss Exchange, Danmarks Nationalbank, BoJ, SNB 
Figure 1: Relationship between 𝐸 and observed market rate 
 
Despite the oversimplification, the actual data do not differ greatly from the results of the model. The 
slope of CHF is steeper than the EUR and this is precisely the model’s implication: as 𝐸 approaches 
1.0, the sensitivity of the market rate to 𝐸 increases.  
     Some deviation from the theoretical rate can be explained by the characteristics of the selected 
short-term rates. For example, a collateralized rate SARON (Swiss Average Rate Overnight) is used 
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for CHF while an unsecured rate Denmark T/N (Tomorrow/Next) is used for the Danish krone 
(DKK). Therefore, the differences in the model can be interpreted as risk premium and collateral 
demand. In the case of EUR, the overnight rate selected here is the benchmark rate €STR. This is an 
unsecured rate but is composed of the deposit rate offered by the major banks. Hence, it tends to be 
lower than the negative remuneration rate set by the central bank. If we can use the EONIA, the 
lending rate offered by the major banks, the position of the points are above the model. However, the 
calculation method of the EONIA changed in October 2019 and only reflects the subsequent 
development of €STR.     
Another interesting observation is that of a relatively vertical line for the Japanese yen (JPY). The 
rate used here is the unsecured rate TONAR, and the observed rate is volatile around −0.5. One of the 
reasons for this may be that 𝐸 is as high as 0.99; this situation may have risen in order to preserve the 
market function. Equation (7) explains how the market trading activity 𝑉 is maximized at around 𝐸 =
1.0; this is further proven by the directional changes in 2019 for both EUR and CHF currencies as 
they highlight high sensitivity of the market rate to E.   
Equation (8) predicts that the negative remuneration share for JPY is approximately 13%; in 
reality, it is close to 5%. This may be linked to the reserve neutral exemption scheme of Japan. The 
exemption limit in Japan is based on the actual reserve size in 2015 and the amount of the funding 
from the central bank, unlike the cases of the Euro and CHF (in the eurozone and Switzerland 
respectively), where the exemption amount is defined by the multiple of the reserve requirements. 
Therefore, the reserve position relative to the exemption is distributed more evenly such as 
𝑥𝑖~(0.3,0.7) compared to the default setup of the model 𝑥𝑖~(0,1). As a result, the slope of the curve 
modeled in (7) becomes roughly 2.5 times the original sensitivity. 
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4. Conclusions 
This study proposes a simplistic model operating in an interbank market with tiering remuneration. 
One of the limitations of the model, rather an effect of the oversimplification, is that the model does 
not consider the actual demand of cash in the interbank market. The original purpose of the interbank 
trade is to adjust the reserve position by considering payment shocks, fulfilling reserve requirements, 
and real funding needs for investing activity. In the case of Denmark, where the ratio of the central 
bank’s balance sheet over GDP is relatively small compared to other jurisdictions, the actual 
requirement of the funding is not negligible in the formation of the market rate. In the case of 
Switzerland, where the negative remuneration is calculated daily, the payment shock of each day 
plays an important role. 
This study has given priority to simplicity to help in understanding the mechanism of the tiering 
system and its impact in the interbank market. The prediction of actual market data may not be perfect 
but it is acceptable in some cases. The author believes that the model proposed in this study offers a 
good balance of simplicity and efficiency within a practical approach. 
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